EXHIBIT A

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND SOUTHERN DIVISION

ORIGINAL

BAVARIAN NORDIC A/S,

: Case No. 06-2406

Plaintiff,

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ACAMBIS, INC., et al., : Greenbelt, Maryland

Defendants. : December 13, 2006

TELEPHONE CONFERENCE

BEFORE: THE HONORABLE CHARLES B. DAY, Judge

APPEARANCES:

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For the Defendant

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KEYNOTE: "---" Indicates inaudible in transcript.

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PROCEEDINGS

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THE COURT: Okay. This is the case of Bavarian Nordic versus Acambis, Case No. DKC-06-2406. And if I could have counsel identify themselves for the record.

MR. LUBITZ: David Lubitz, L-u-b-i-t-z, on behalf of Bavarian Nordic. Good morning, Your Honor.

MR. DUNN: And Jeff Dunn, D-u-n-n, of the Venable firm, on behalf of Acambis, Your Honor. Good morning.

THE COURT: Good morning.

MR. FREDERICK: Good morning, Your Honor. Jim Frederick, from the United States Attorney's Office, on behalf of the National Institutes of Health.

MR. HOSKIN: Good morning, Your Honor. This is Gary Hoskin, from the Department of Justice, Intellectual Property Section. With me also is Erica Franklin of our section. Also on behalf of NIH.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you all.

MR. FREDERICK: Your Honor, this is Jim Frederick. Just real briefly, Mr. Hoskin and his assistant there will be handling the substance of this matter on behalf of the Government.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. And if I am correct, this is really a matter between Bavarian Nordic and the Government, and I assume counsel for Acambis is really just here for the ride?

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MR. DUNN: That is pretty much accurate, Your We have an interest in it, but it is their motion.

THE COURT: Got you. Okay. Well, since it is the motion of Bavarian Nordic, I will give you first and last opportunity. I have -- in the interest of full disclosure, I have reviewed all of the materials that the parties have provided. I have looked at virtually all of the cases.

I certainly have my leanings going in, but I'm having a hearing because, in fact, I want to make sure that I'm right and I want to see if there is anything that I have missed. And, this is your opportunity to move me off of whatever dime I'm sitting.

So, Plaintiff, you get to go first.

MR. LUBITZ: Thank you, Your Honor. As the Court is aware, Bavarian Nordic issued a subpoena in this matter, dated July 24th. The subpoena asked for documents, as well as testimony.

If the Court is amenable, I will discuss the subpoena for documents first.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. LUBITZ: The NIH has responded in this matter by letter dated August 1st objecting to the production of documents, as well as the production of individuals for testimony. Bavarian Nordic then endeavored to have oral discussions with the Government in an effort to try to come to some resolution of this matter.

And then, on September 1st, 2006, Bavarian Nordic sent a letter to NIH narrowing the topics for the requested documents, as well as for testimony. And NIH never replied thereafter.

With respect to the subpoena for documents, NIH is in violation of its own regulation, 45 CFR, Section 2.5 therein. The regulation requires NIH to treat the subpoenas as subpoenas. So long as the subpoenas are legally positioned, the Court has jurisdiction over them and -- and --

THE COURT: Properly served.

MR. LUBITZ: Properly served. That is right. Thank you.

THE COURT: Okay:

MR. LUBITZ: Your Honor, can I just interject and say that two of my colleagues, Robert Burdon and Crystal Lynch, have joined me. But I will continue.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. LUBITZ: So, in that regard, Your Honor, NIH was required to respond with documents responsive to our request, and they did not do so. They objected, citing various grounds, but none of the grounds really go to the sufficiency of the -- the legal sufficiency of the subpoena, the proper service or this Court's jurisdiction. So, for

that reason, we think there is a violation of the APA.

THE COURT: Let me ask a question. How is this really different from say the classic civil dispute to when a party files a request for discovery and they don't get proper responses? One side decides to file a motion for a protective order, and the other one decides a motion to compel. Aren't they really just flip sides of the same issue.

MR. LUBITZ: Well, there has been no motion for a protective order filed by NIH in this case, and I would agree with you that essentially, under the facts of this matter, NIH is no different than a private party with respect to the substance of the subpoena and the motion to compel.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. LUBITZ: With respect to the subpoena for testimony, it is true that NIH has objected saying that it is not in its interest to comply with the subpoena for testimony. But under the circumstances of this case, Your Honor, we think it pretty clear that their decision also violates the APA.

There is a material transfer agreement that NIH entered into with Acambis holding NIH harmless and indemnifying NIH. So, the idea that they are somehow liable in this case is incorrect.

THE COURT: Let me ask a question. Does NIH face

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any exposure from any other litigant that may want to sue

any exposure from any other litigant that may want to sue them over this issue?

MR. LUBITZ: Well, I think not because of the material transfer agreement. The provision of the material transfer agreement is extremely broad, and I'm not aware of any other parties who claim an intellectual property interest in the MVA that is at issue in the underlying matter.

THE COURT: Well, let me be more direct. Is there anything that would prevent Bavarian Nordic from bringing direct suit against NIH?

MR. LUBITZ: Well, no. Not to my knowledge. I mean, you -- you mean anything legally? Any legal --

THE COURT: Yes. Sovereign immunity would not prevent that. Is that right?

MR. LUBITZ: Well, I think that -- well, sovereign immunity, as this Court is aware, certainly applies in suits against the government. I mean, it could affect perhaps the forum. So, I mean, I don't know the degree to which sovereign immunity would prevent Bavarian Nordic from suing the government.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. LUBITZ: But, in any event, with respect to the subpoena for testimony, we also are confident that NIH has violated 45 CFR, Section 2.1(b), which requires a policy of strict impartiality on the part of NIH in suits between

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private parties.

Here in its letter objection to Bavarian Nordic NIH has, on at least a couple of occasions, directly refuted some of Bavarian Nordic's central allegations that are made in the complaint here. And given the centrality of NIH's participation in the receipt and transfer of the MVA virus to Acambis, we think that the facts really are such here that it requires testimony on the part of NIH officials.

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THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. Let me swing around to the Government.

MR. HOSKIN: Thank you, Your Honor. This is Gary I quess -- well, first, as I understand it, Bavarian Nordic is not addressing the testimonial aspect of it at all. So, we are just dealing with the documents at this point.

THE COURT: I think that was his last argument.

MR. LUBITZ: That is correct, Your Honor. addressing the testimonial portion.

Okay. As to the -- let me start MR. HOSKIN: though with the testimonial portion because I think that is, by far, the clearest. I think the <u>Tuhey</u> case directly addresses that.

As to the ability of the Court to determine whether it is really in the best interest of NIH to provide testimony, we don't think that the Court is really in the best position to do that. This is a type of decision that is

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really best left to NIH to determine what is in its best interest and what is not.

THE COURT: Don't you really have to take, head on, this question about the $\underline{\text{Vioxx}}$ decision?

MR. HOSKIN: Well, I don't think we do, Your Honor. I think in this circuit the law is clear as to sovereign immunity. Now, the <u>Vioxx</u> decision dealt with a totally different question, and that is whether or not the Government is a person, not whether the Government, even if a person, has sovereign immunity.

We are not addressing the person part of it. <u>Vioxx</u> may have viability certainly in the Fifth Circuit.

THE COURT: At least the Eastern District of Louisiana.

MR. HOSKIN: Correct. But in this circuit certainly <u>Comsat</u> is the controlling law. It says that the Government does have sovereign immunity and that, therefore, this is to be treated as an APA action and not under Rule 45.

THE COURT: I don't think anybody is disputing that this is an APA issue. I think you are all on the same page with that, and I agree.

MR. HOSKIN: And therefore, as a result of that, the <u>Vioxx</u> issue of whether or not the government is a person really falls away, since we are not dealing with Rule 45 and whether or not it is -- the government can be a person under

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Rule 45.

Didn't the Vioxx decision go on to say THE COURT: that the Court found that the refusal under the APA arbitrary capricious standard was one which the FDA failed to get over, and therefore, it was going to allow the depositions?

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MR. HOSKIN: And we don't dispute that even under <u>Comsat</u> that the government -- or that the Court rather has the ability to reach the arbitrary/capricious standard. But as we point out in our brief, there are some decisions and we think this is one, that are really best left to the agency. And it is really very difficult for a Court to come in and say, well, this Court believes that the -- that the Government's best interests are not in withholding testimony.

And I think that in real as -- that is exactly what the <u>Tuhey</u> case stands for, the proposition that once a government executive, a secretary of a department, has issued orders, that those orders are to generally to be obeyed, unless there can be a showing that they have violated their own regulations, and we don't have that here. Certainly not as to the testimony.

The question on the document side may be a little bit different, but I will address that in a moment.

THE COURT: But in the Court's review of the arbitrary/capricious question, isn't there a need for the Court to look at the explanation offered by the Government

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and to see if, in fact, it fits with the context of the case?

Well, that is true, Your Honor. Well, MR. HOSKIN: I don't think with the context of the case. I think the question is whether the agency has determination -- is arbitrary and capricious looking at the reasons that the agency gave. You don't look at the case at all.

THE COURT: Well, I think we are saying the same It is one thing to say that we are not going to thing. release these materials because we don't like the way you look. That would be arbitrary and capricious.

It is another thing to say we are not going to release or allow someone to testify because we don't think it is in our best interest.

MR. HOSKIN: That is correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: So, if there is, I guess, a place for the Court to at least look behind the label of saying we are not going to allow this testimony under the Tuhey decision or the <u>Tuhey</u> rationale, but then to say why is it that you are not going to do so and does it at least pass, you know, the laugh test?

MR. HOSKIN: Well, that is correct, Your Honor, and I think you have to look at all of the reasons the agency gave. I think in this case that goes a little beyond just we don't want to do it because it is not in our best interest, but I think that is certainly a central issue.

Unless the Court has some other questions, I would like to maybe move on to the documents.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. HOSKIN: The first thing that I would like to point out is if we go to Exhibit 9, which is this follow on (sic) September 1st letter in which, I guess, Bavarian Nordic complains now that they haven't received a response, I would like to point out that the reason that they didn't receive a response is that essentially the -- they sent the letter on September 1st, which is the Friday before Labor Day.

The letter, on page 10, indicates that they intend to file a motion the following week and are nonspecific as to what day during that week. So, of four possible work days in which they could file the motion, it could have been anywhere from Tuesday to Friday.

I think it is -- and the letter itself is 10 pages long.

THE COURT: But the motion wasn't filed actually for another 13 days.

MR. HOSKIN: Yes. It was filed on the 14th, Your Honor. But the expectation from the letter itself is that the motion could be filed any time from the 5th to the 8th.

THE COURT: Well, wasn't that driven, in part, by the need to get this done before discovery closed on September 21?

MR. HOSKIN: Well, it seems to be a little disingenuous to wait until the last minute and then say you have a lack of time. --- in which if they wanted to pursue it, they could have gone ahead and pursued it with the agency.

which you all had some previous communications where they had expressed an intent to narrow the discovery, the scope of the request. Intervening along the way was the deposition. And then right after that they say, okay, by the way, here is the narrow request; let's talk about it or let's move forward. And basically, it sounds like the Government disappeared.

MR. HOSKIN: Well, I wouldn't say that, Your Honor.

I think that you are requesting a response within one or two
days to a 10-page letter. It is a little unrealistic, to say
the least.

The fact that they waited another 11 days is -certainly was their call, not the Government's. The
anticipation by NIH at least was that the -- or appears to be
that the letter, on its face, was saying that the motion was
going to be filed regardless.

You give a person one to two days to respond to a 10-day letter and then complain about it? I find that hard to believe, Your Honor. But going to the merits, I think there is an important point that is made in the response of

NIH, and that is --

THE COURT: Before you get there, you have taken me a good long way in terms of the unreasonableness, if you will, of Bavarian to expect, I guess, an instantaneous response. It is true that the letter says we expect you to does. And let me find the language where it says we are going to move to enforce the subpoena, which we will do next week absent a response.

Well, you used the word earlier about call, c-a-l-l. Maybe a call, an email note saying, hey, we have got it, we are thinking about it, we will get back to you, can we have more time? Why none of that?

MR. HOSKIN: I am not here to testify on behalf of the agency as to what their motivation was or why it -- you know, they did not respond sooner. You know, I think that --

THE COURT: They did not respond at all.

MR. HOSKIN: Especially if you look at the intent of the letter. The last -- the next to last paragraph on page 10, I'm not so sure that that is an offer of compromise as it is essentially a threat; that if you don't react in the next couple of days, we are going to file the suit anyway.

THE COURT: You may be right about that. Okay.

I'm sorry. I have slowed you down enough. Go right ahead to the next issue.

MR. HOSKIN: Moving then to the -- it is actually

the merits of their argument. I apologize for my cough, Your Honor.

THE COURT: That is all right.

MR. HOSKIN: There has been no violation of the regulation here, but I think an important point to note is at the very beginning in the response of NIH they indicate that they have already, in response to the ITC subpoena, which they treated as a FOIA request -- they had already produced essentially all of the documents that they had that they would be willing to produce.

THE COURT: So that means you wouldn't be producing any documents regarding the relationship between NIH and Acambis that may have been the subject to this issue?

MR. HOSKIN: I believe that the indication is that all documents -- remembering that the ITC case essentially involves the same parties, was brought by Bavarian Nordic at the same time, involves many of the same issues, or at least the factual predicate for the issues are the same, the same documents were produced; would have been produced.

THE COURT: I got the impression from Bavarian's reply memorandum that the only thing that was produced was basically what Bavarian already had, those documents relating to the relationship between Bavarian and NIH. However, the scope of their inquiries go beyond that and really are talking about what is going on between Acambis and NIH with

respect to this virus strain and the relationships.

Am I missing that? And I know you didn't have a chance to file any kind of sur-reply or a rebuttal brief, but that was the last word I had on that subject.

MR. HOSKIN: Well, I think, Your Honor, that the -that much of -- I gather from -- in a sense, from NIH's
response; that whatever documents that BN believes that they
have would not have been produced in any event.

To the extent that -- I guess right now the issue as framed is based on -- the only denial that we have is the denial of the initial subpoena, which --

THE COURT: Is that --- not attached?

MR. HOSKIN: -- really the lack of information provided and lack of a basis for requesting the information from NIH. That is Exhibit 1, the two-page letter from BN.

Based on that letter and the denial of the request from NIH, it is what this Court has -- it is how this Court has to reach its decision. I think it is speculation, to some degree, to try to determine what NIH would do if -- you know, if it had proceeded and maybe if there had been further discussions. That is something that maybe -- that there may be some middle ground in, but that didn't occur.

We have the bare request for documents from BN. We have the denial of that request based on essentially that the documents have already been produced or -- or at least

anything that would -- that the agency felt would be produced had already been produced in the prior request.

And I think that actually answers, for the most part, what -- you know, what Bavarian Nordic is seeking. I mean, if that is all the agency would be giving them, treating this again as a FOIA request since the Government is not a party, then what are we really arguing about?

THE COURT: Is there anything to prohibit the Government from being sued by Bavarian Nordic?

MR. HOSKIN: That is a difficult question, Your Honor, because we have to speculate as to what Bavarian Nordic's grounds for suit would be, and that is something that I'm not really prepared to do. I think that -- I don't know of any general prohibition against Bavarian Nordic suing the United States, but obviously it would depend a lot on what the allegations in any complaint would be.

And here, so far the only thing that Bavarian Nordic has alleged is essentially some type of trade secret violation, perhaps a violation of some kind of an agreement. But the allegations are -- have never been actually framed against the United States, and so I would really hesitate to speculate as to how or what Bavarian Nordic believes that they could bring against the United States.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. LUBITZ: Your Honor, may I reply to some of the

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points made by counsel?

THE COURT: Yes. It is your motion. So you get the last word.

MR. DUNN: Your Honor?

THE COURT: Yes?

MR. DUNN: Jeff Dunn. I would like to offer just one or two observations, if I could. I don't know whether you want that before or --

THE COURT: I probably should not, in the sense that really the briefing is between the Government and Bavarian Nordic. I suspect that you have got more knowledge about this than I could ever hope to have. I probably should limit it to these two on the record.

MR. DUNN: That is fine, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. But thank you so much.

MR. LUBITZ: Your Honor, first of all, with respect to the sequencing of events in this matter, I just also want to point out that there was a certificate of conference of counsel that was filed with our motion to compel in which it is noted that after we sent our September 1st letter to NIH we then followed up with a phone call on September 11th explaining to them that we would file suit unless we could come to a resolution of this matter.

So, I think the idea that Bavarian Nordic has not gone as far as it possibly could go to try to resolve this

matter short of litigation is incorrect. I mean, just sort of taking a step back, you have got a subpoena, you have got an objection, you have got a series of phone calls of counsel for Bavarian Nordic to NIH.

After those series of phone calls you have got a September 1st letter. Still no response from NIH. And then you have got a final phone call from counsel for Bavarian Nordic. So I think that the -- the idea that somehow procedurally Bavarian Nordic has not done everything it possibly could before putting this issue before the Court is just not correct.

With respect to the documents and the ITC proceeding, I think it is -- it should be pretty clear, as a matter of law, that a FOIA response is less than what --- might be entitled to under Rule 25. And for support of that, Your Honor, I think I can just point you to the Federal Register cite from our reply brief. That is 68 Federal Register 25-838, which is the final rule of promulgating amendments to 45 CFR Part 2.

And in that Federal Register cite NIH, or the Department of Health and Human Services itself, notes that -- I will quote it. It says, "These amendments -- I'm going to quote the paragraph that surrounds the phrase that I cited in my reply brief.

"These amendments are designed to address cases in

which a federal court has jurisdiction to issue a subpoena for DHHS documents. In such cases the current regulation may infringe on the power of the Court by allowing greater authority to withhold a document under the FOIA than would be the case under the rules governing the disclosure of documents in court." Then it cites the Supreme Court case of FTC against Grover, Inc.

It says it is not the intention of the department "to create or broaden a federal litigation privilege through this part. We are amending the regulation to limit the applicability of FOIA to situations in which the issuing tribunal has no jurisdiction over the department."

It should be pretty clear that NIH needs to go back and look at its documents to see whether there are ones that we are entitled to under the subpoena that is before this Court. NIH, in responding to the ITC issued subpoena, asserted that the ITC did not have jurisdiction over it, and therefore, was treating that subpoena pursuant to FOIA.

THE COURT: Well, let me slow you down and see if I understand the Government's position on this just a tad.

Didn't the Government say somewhere in its briefing that you never provided the Court with the right subpoena to pursue this at this time?

MR. LUBITZ: Well, I think the Government said that, and we didn't provide the ITC subpoena, but we are not

asking the Court to rule on the ITC issued subpoena.

THE COURT: I gather that. I thought that they were saying that you did not provide the right subpoena in this case. But did you do so in your submissions? Was that Exhibit No. 1 or 2?

MR. LUBITZ: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Let me hear from the Government on that point.

MR. HOSKIN: No. I don't think that is the argument that we made, Your Honor.

THE COURT: You are saying that they subpoensed NIH and they should have subpoensed Dr. Moss?

MR. HOSKIN: Well, no. There are several different subpoenas out here, and I think that the -- there is an argument made by BN relating to the subpoena to Moss and our efforts to limit Dr. Moss' testimony consistent with <u>Tuhey</u>.

Now, BN makes a fairly extended argument relating to the Moss deposition and what occurred at that deposition. Our argument was that none of that is relevant to this issue because that was a separate subpoena and Tambian has never raised the legitimacy of the Government's actions in that subpoena as being improper or -- you know, in any way.

THE COURT: Let me shape the question so I can understand better this point. I am looking at Exhibit 1 that was attached to the Plaintiff's motion.

MR. HOSKIN: Correct, Your Honor. 1 THE COURT: Okay. Are you with me? 2 MR. HOSKIN: That is a subpoena to NIH. 3 THE COURT: This is a subpoena for the documents 4 that we are arguing about in part here today. Correct? 5 That is correct. MR. HOSKIN: 6 THE COURT: Okay. This is the subpoena to which I 7 don't believe the Government has ever suggested that it was 8 legally insufficient or that it was improperly served or that 9 the Court didn't have authority. Is that right? 10 MR. HOSKIN: The first two are correct. We have 11 not disputed that it was -- the service. Well, I guess to a 12 certain degree the legal sufficiency or the jurisdiction or 13 the question because of the Government's sovereign immunity. 14 THE COURT: Was that raised in your papers? 15 MR. HOSKIN: Excuse me? 16 THE COURT: Was that raised in your papers? 17 MR. HOSKIN: Yes, Your Honor. I believe it is. 18 THE COURT: Take me there again. 19 (Pause.) 20 MR. HOSKIN: Page 12, Your Honor. The ---21 paragraph begins, "Although NIH responds, it does not 22 specifically articulate counsel's conclusions." 23 THE COURT: Yes. I have that highlighted with a 24 question mark beside it. So, give me just a moment. 25

(Pause.)

THE COURT: And for some reason you think that because you are not a party to the litigation that this subpoena, under Rule 45, is barred. Under Comsat? Is that where you are at?

MR. HOSKIN: Yes. Our argument is that under NIH's own regulation and in light of <u>Comsat</u> that the NIH was only required to treat the subpoena as a request under FOIA.

THE COURT: I thought that came under the regulation cited Title 45 CFR 2.5(b). Sub 'b' says if it is legally insufficient, improperly served or the Court doesn't have jurisdiction, then the subpoena shall be deemed a request under FOIA. What am I missing? Obviously something is going on.

MR. HOSKIN: I am not sure that you are missing anything, Your Honor. I think that the -- there is essentially a tension here because of the Government's sovereign immunity, and -- so how you can serve a subpoena that is enforceable against the Government when it is immune is the question.

The <u>Comsat</u> case and NIH's own regulations certainly provide for providing documents; treating any subpoena as a FOIA request and providing documents.

THE COURT: Any subpoena or only subpoenas that are in some way defective.

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the Comsat decision.

Right. Or over -- where the Court MR. HOSKIN: does not have jurisdiction over the party. THE COURT: Correct. Okay. MR. HOSKIN: And in this case it is our contention that the Court does not have jurisdiction over the Government because of sovereign immunity. THE COURT: Because you are not a party to the litigation? MR. HOSKIN: Exactly. May I reply to that point? THE COURT: Just a moment. I want to make sure I grasp it all though, and I think I need counsel now to take me to Comsat and to highlight that language for me again. I'm looking myself, and maybe I'm just missing it, because Comsat was dealing with an arbitrator's subpoena, not a court subpoena. MR. HOSKIN: That is true, Your Honor. (Pause.) MR. HOSKIN: I think it is the portion --THE COURT: Take your time. MR. HOSKIN: We address at length in the standard of review section, starting on page four. THE COURT: I wasn't so much looking at your memorandum, but I will go back there. Give me a second. Standard review. I have got it. And you cite page 274 of

MR. HOSKIN: Correct.

THE COURT: Let me turn to page 274. "When the Government is not a party, the APA provides the sole avenue of review of an agency's refusal to permit its employees to comply with subpoenas. I read that as testimonial subpoenas. Am I missing something?

MR. HOSKIN: If I may have just a moment, Your Honor.

(Pause.)

MR. HOSKIN: That is dealing with testimonial subpoenas. That is correct. But I think that there is also a statement I have referenced on 277.

THE COURT: Okay. Give me a second. Let me find my place.

(Pause.)

THE COURT: 277. I'm there.

MR. HOSKIN: I don't have the exact quote, Your
Honor, but I had cited it as saying that sovereign immunity
generally permits the federal government to refute compliance
with a third party subpoena.

THE COURT: I think that language is reflected in the next to the last paragraph of the decision under subtitle three where it says "in summary" and then maybe a couple of sentences therein. I have been reading that to talk about the testimonial portion as opposed to documents.

MR. HOSKIN: Your Honor, I think that -- the difference -- the only real difference between these situations, between testimony and documents, is that the government generally has waived a certain degree of sovereign through FOIA for documents. There is a set statutory procedure which obviously even if the -- if there is absolutely no jurisdiction of any court over the government, any citizen could come in and request documents.

The regulations essentially account for that by setting up one procedure for documents and one procedure for testimony of employees. I think that is why there may be a little bit of a confusion here. The rules generally apply — in terms of jurisdiction and sovereign immunity apply to the government as a whole, and it shouldn't make any difference as to whether it is documentary or testimonial, but for the fact that FOIA exists and we always have to account for FOIA.

And that is what the NIH's own regulations attempt to do. It sets one standard for testimony where FOIA would not apply in any event, and a separate standard then for documents where even if the subpoena is insufficient, the agency would comply with what it would ordinarily have to comply with anyway, which is the FOIA standard.

THE COURT: Give me a moment.

(Pause.)

THE COURT: Okay. Let me hear further from

Bavarian.

MR. LUBITZ: Your Honor, first of all, the waiver of sovereign immunity, of course, is subject to the APA, which provides for an arbitrary, capricious and contrary to law standard of review. The government and NIH are subject to Rule 45. If you look at both the <u>Vioxx</u> decision and the recent D.C. Circuit decision that I cited, I think it should be pretty clear that the government is a person under Rule 45.

In addition, the regulations -- NIH's own regulations provide that FOIA is only applicable where a party sends something to the government that should not be construed as a subpoena. That is not the case here. The regulations themselves provide that so long as the Court has jurisdiction, so long as the subpoena is legally sufficient and so long as service is proper, that NIH is supposed to treat that subpoena as a subpoena.

THE COURT: So, is it your position that Comsat's language, with respect to federal of civil procedure 45 where it says in the last paragraph that the District Court erred in enforcing the arbitrator's subpoenas, the Court also erred when it reviewed the government's actions under Rule 45 rather than the APA, that that really is only triggered because the arbitrator did not have appropriate authority to issue the subpoena?

MR. LUBITZ: I think that is one point. But I think the other point is that what Comsat stands for is that the subpoenas themselves, when the government is not a party, should be reviewed under the APA's arbitrary, capricious and contrary to law standard. And, of course, Rule 45 has a less onerous undue burden standard, at least from the perspective of the subpoenaing party, leaving that as the critical point that Comsat was making.

THE COURT: Well, if your position is true, then it all comes full circle with respect to an analysis as to whether or not the government's action here was arbitrary and capricious.

MR. LUBITZ: Yes.

THE COURT: I'm sorry? I couldn't hear you.

MR. LUBITZ: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay. And you bear the burden of proof on that, and that is what you have set forth, at least your position, in your papers. Is that right?

MR. LUBITZ: Yes. Yes. So, the idea that this

Court has no jurisdiction because the subpoenas are

unenforceable pursuant to Rule 45 I think is incorrect.

These subpoenas with respect to the documents pass the test

under 45 CFR, Section 2.5(a), and the government was obliged,

or NIH was obliged, to treat these as subpoenas for

documents.

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And they violated their own regulations, and in doing so they violated the APA's arbitrary and capricious standard.

THE COURT: Okay. I understand where you are coming from.

MR. LUBITZ: Okay. And then, with respect to the testimony of -- to pick up on your analogy, Your Honor, you said that if NIH had said, well, we are not going to enforce this subpoena because we don't like the way you look, that that would be arbitrary and capricious. I think everybody agrees with that.

I think if NIH further said we are not going to enforce these subpoenss because we think it is not in our best interest because we don't like the way you look, this Court would also be obliged to hold that NIH's determination that it wasn't in its own best interest to enforce the subpoena is arbitrary and capricious and contrary to law.

And, in effect, that is what NIH has done with respect to the subpoena for testimony. The reasons that they have given as to why they refused to permit their employees to sit for testimony are arbitrary, capricious and contrary to law. They violate the section of the regulations that require strict impartiality and the reasons — when you look at the context of this particular case with the fact that there is a material transfer agreement here, as well as a

protective order, a two-tier protective order in place, they don't hold water. They are arbitrary and capricious.

THE COURT: Aren't they saying in both instances, and haven't they said in both instances, that the reason we are not going to do this is because you are going to make us look bad?

MR. LUBITZ: Yes. And that is an arbitrary and capricious reason.

THE COURT: At least under the $\underline{\text{Vioxx}}$ decision it is.

MR. LUBITZ: Yes. And not only that, but if you look at the housekeeping statute here, if you look at the Project Bioshield legislation here, all of those are different components of showing that that reason is arbitrary and capricious.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. Let me hear further from the Government.

MR. HOSKIN: Just a couple of points, Your Honor. First, the reason that the agency withheld testimony is not because they would look bad, but because they would not have an adequate ability to defend themselves and their employees.

THE COURT: Defend yourself from no lawsuit?

MR. HOSKIN: Well, we wouldn't be a party. And as we point out in the brief, Bavarian Nordic's attorneys, even at the deposition, tried to prevent government counsel from

presenting any objections during the testimony.

THE COURT: I think it was just the opposite. It was government attorneys who were preventing Bavarian Nordic counsel from discovery, and be that right or be it wrong, they were the ones there who were there to protect their own interests. And I'm still struggling with if it is not about a lawsuit, what is the interests that the government is trying to protect that they cannot protect?

MR. HOSKIN: Well, --- party to the lawsuit. We could seek our own testimony. We could seek discovery from the other parties. We could show what the weaknesses of their arguments are and --

THE COURT: Let me try differently. If the government is not being blamed, what is it that the government -- and if the government has no fear of being sued, what is the need for the government to protect anything?

MR. HOSKIN: Well, we are being blamed. That is the whole point. Acambis hasn't been accused of any wrongdoing, but the NIH employees have been.

THE COURT: Acambis is being sued. Acambis is being sued. There is a formal charge against Acambis, be it right or be it wrong. You are being -- at least your employees are being subpoenaed to provide testimony.

Now, when I say it is one thing to talk about

having blamed in a non-legal sense. If the theories that are lined just beneath Bavarian Nordic's action here hold true, then what they are really saying is Acambis may have done something wrong, but guess what? The folks over at NIH, including Dr. Moss, did something terribly wrong as well. They breached the contract and all these other things.

Well, if those other things never grow up to be a lawsuit or if the government never has exposure directly, regardless of indemnity or anything else, if they could never be sued by Bavarian Nordic or anyone else on this action, what is the interest, the legal interest, that the government needs to protect by being a party opponent.

MR. HOSKIN: If all of those things were true, Your Honor, there would be no need.

THE COURT: Okay. So what is it?

MR. HOSKIN: That is the question, is whether any of those things are true, and that is the problem that we face. The allegations are made in a lawsuit in which we have no ability to take discovery, no ability to defend the government or its employees and, to a certain degree, that after BN gets done with its suit with Acambis, that it won't file suit against the government.

THE COURT: That is the interest then.

MR. HOSKIN: That it won't use the very discovery it got as a basis for another lawsuit against the government.

THE COURT: Well, that would be the legal interest that I think you have been hinting around that you have some exposure on.

MR. HOSKIN: Well, certainly that is a possibility. The trouble is we don't know right whether we have exposure or not because Bavarian Nordic essentially is playing games out here.

THE COURT: Okay. I appreciate the fact that there may be the potential for a lawsuit. Whether it is in reality or not, 'you don't know sitting where you are today, and there is nothing wrong about that analysis.

But in the event -- let's assume there was a law out there that says the government cannot be sued by Bavarian Nordic on this claim or anything related to it, I don't know that the government has a need to protect any other interests by being a party litigant. And if I'm missing -- I'm trying to figure out if there is something else aside from the potential of a lawsuit that the government is concerned about.

MR. HOSKIN: Well, --

THE COURT: Why else would you take depositions?

MR. HOSKIN: Well, I guess if there was no possibility of a lawsuit against the government or its employees for their actions in the course of their employment, then that would be true. Unfortunately, such a

1 law just does not exist.

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THE COURT: Okay. Fair enough?

MR. LUBITZ: Your Honor, may I just make two points?

THE COURT: Well, you were promised the last word. So, go ahead.

MR. HOSKIN: Before he does, Your Honor, I have one other point I would like to make.

THE COURT: Okay. I am going to give him the last word. So, you slip in now while you can.

MR. HOSKIN: One of the -- I think one thing that may have been lost in the discussion here is that one of the very significant reasons for denying the subpoena, or the production under the subpoena, was NIH's determination that the request failed to comply with the regulation, and I think that is an important point that the Court should look at. That is all I have, Your Honor.

THE COURT: How did it fail to comply?

MR. HOSKIN: Well, particularly that the information requested was not otherwise available from another source. Most of the information that was requested is stuff that either BN should have in its own possession or people like Dr. Mayer or its -- or co-plaintiff should know because he was a party to the discussions. Information that was already available from Acambis or from other sources,

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such as the information previously supplied to the ITC subpoena.

THE COURT: Well, let me try it like this. I haven't taken the time to look through or commit to memory all of the various topics and issues attached to this subpoena. I'm looking at -- just say question number 11.

"All documents concerning any steps taken by NIH to isolate individuals at NIH who received or are exposed to confidential information from Bavarian Nordic."

Are you telling me that information has been provided in the FOIA request or would have been provided?

MR. HOSKIN: Well, no. I think that the point that I am trying to make here, Your Honor, is that as to each one of these requests Bavarian Nordic did not indicate why that information was not available from another source. It implied the only place they could go was the government.

THE COURT: Wasn't that the subject of the letter that they wrote to you?

MR. HOSKIN: Well, their response to NIH was the September 1st letter which, of course, became water under the bridge as soon as this action was filed. But even in that letter, Your Honor, all they did is say, well, it is not available from other sources.

For instance, with Dr. Mayer in particular they say, well, because we don't know essentially what the NIH

would say about Dr. Mayer; discussions with NIH. That is not the question. It is what -- certainly you may not have complete information in the sense where you are talking about discussions that each and every person may have a different point of view. That is not the question.

The question is whether the information is available from another source, and in each one of these cases the regulation requires that the first requestor provide information as to why they can't get the requested information from a different source.

THE COURT: Okay. Let me ask it this way. Let's go down to number 22. They asked for NIH policies regarding employment and consulting agreement between NIH employees and third parties. What would be the other source of information there?

MR. HOSKIN: Your Honor, again, I think we are reversing the question.

THE COURT: Okay. I understand that they have a burden to tell you why they can't get it. I am assuming to some degree that was articulated in the letter of September 1, 2006. This question, standing on its face, would give one great reason to think that they have this information in their possession, nor would they have legal, reasonable means to obtain.

It is like asking you what do you do in-house. And

it talks about third parties with no indication of who these third parties may be. You are telling me they need to tell you something else to respond to this question other than we don't know and we don't know where to find it?

MR. HOSKIN: I think -- certainly there is -- to the extent that that also requests documents, I'm not sure that that hasn't already been answered, in the sense that it may have been produced already. And certainly I think some of these requests may be --

THE COURT: I accept your position with respect to the information they could or should be able to obtain from either Acambis or their own in-house experts, be it Professor Mayer or whoever else.

But it seemed to me, just glancing at this request, that there were some things in there that were certainly beyond their ability to go fetch from some other place.

MR. HOSKIN: And certainly some of those are also answered by the other objections, which is not in the interest of NIH. But at the end of the day there perhaps are some documents which the government would be willing to produce in response to a request where the -- Bavarian Nordic comes in and says, yes, these are the few times that we just cannot get anywhere else and narrow it down that way and provide the government with some -- either some basis or -- and certainly some of these -- you know, we have got a forest

of requests here and one tree that -- or maybe two trees that have some validity.

THE COURT: I love that analogy. I am going to steal it and use it somewhere else.

MR. HOSKIN: Thank you. I would be honored.

THE COURT: Is that to say that if their September 1st letter had come in and given you a longer window to respond, that there may be something out there that may be worthy of a response?

MR. HOSKIN: I think in terms of the document request that is certainly the case. Now, part of the problem here is the -- Bavarian Nordic has mentioned the September 11th conference, and I think there is a bit of debate here as to whether that was really an attempt to settle or whether at the end of that conference the government was essentially told this is the end, we are filing suit and as a result of that took no further action.

THE COURT: Okay. I can appreciate that. I think the point that was being made by Mr. Lubitz at that point was that the letter of September 1 wasn't the last communication. By the way, we picked up the phone on the 11th and we were still seeing if something was coming, and it wasn't.

It very well may be, from your perspective at least, that at the end of that discussion on the 11th this was a matter headed for the courthouse steps.

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MR. HOSKIN: Right. And certainly I think it is a matter of common experience too, at least for -- in the sense that it is well known that once it becomes a matter in litigation then the agency turns it over to the Department of Justice, and we are the ones that are responsible for all actions thereafter.

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So, yes. It is not -- or it is not a case, one way or the other, that the government is in any way attempting to avoid answering. It is a matter of reality, that once we are notified that it is going to be in litigation, you know, it gets transferred. It comes down to the Justice Department or out to the Assistant United States Attorney, or the United States Attorney's Office, and we are the people that become the lawyers.

THE COURT: Well, to the extent that I have a criticism on the exchange here and the procedure between the parties following this September 1 letter, it is that I think the government should have done more. I don't think that they should have read that letter, which said we are going to do something if we haven't heard from you by next week, as saying we have only got a couple of days.

Granted, it is on the tail of a long holiday weekend, but I think to the extent of the parties trying to move these things along, picking up the phone or sending an email note, particularly in light of the extensive activity

that was occurring within the five to seven days before then,

and particularly with the pendency of this close of discovery

on this basically out of district litigation, to just sit and

do nothing; I think there is a better practice out there.

I shouldn't say anything more stronger than that.

I just wish that we could have handled this a little bit differently, and you obviously perceived it in a little different way.

MR. HOSKIN: Well, no, Your Honor. I understand what you are saying, but I think certainly the -- we also have to be aware that this was a very limited amount of time. And as you point out, it is a 10-page letter.

There is no actual even "respond by a certain date." It is just kind of hidden in at the end of the letter. That was my only point, Your Honor. I don't think that it is that unrealistic, given the time frame, that the government didn't respond.

And certainly there is always room for hope that we could respond better or that we should respond quicker, but these are large organizations and it takes time sometimes just to get the request to the large person. And over a holiday weekend, that person may not even be there.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Mr. Hoskin. I promised Mr. Lubitz I would give him another shot. I assume Mr. Dunn is still awake?

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MR. DUNN: Yes, Your Honor. It is hard to keep my mouth shut, but I'm following your guidance.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, thank you, sir, and I appreciate your patience with us.

Mr. Lubitz, your last shot.

MR. LUBITZ: Thank you, Your Honor. Let me just point out first that seven weeks elapsed between the date of the subpoena that Bavarian Nordic served on NIH and the date that Bavarian Nordic filed suit in your court. During those seven weeks there was a single response from the government.

On the side of Bavarian Nordic there was a 10-page letter, as has been extensively discussed, as well as two sets of phone calls.

With respect to the September 1st letter and the allegation by the government here that somehow we haven't explained how we can't get these documents and testimony topics from anywhere else, I think the letter, Exhibit 9 to our motion to compel, goes into great detail on each topic narrowing -- eliminating some topics and narrowing others.

I think, to continue the analogy, if there was a forest, I think that there are now, by virtue of Exhibit 9, the important select trees that are at issue here and all of them are important. And the ways in which Bavarian Nordic needs the information from the government is explained in detail in Exhibit 9.

THE COURT: My goodness. I am starting to feel like a park ranger.

MR. LUBITZ: Well, in Greenbelt I think you have probably got some more trees than we do here.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. LUBITZ: Thirdly, with respect to the issue about any legal liability on the part of NIH, I want to emphasize the broad nature of the release from liability that the government negotiated with Acambis. That is at Exhibit 3, paragraph 11 I believe, which is attached to our motion to compel.

There is an indemnification provision and there is a hold harmless provision.

THE COURT: Does that really help them? I mean, it saves them from any suit brought by Acambis, but it doesn't mean that they don't have to deal with a lawsuit.

MR. LUBITZ: Well, but I think it holds them harmless. I am just going to take a look at paragraph 11 and just quote it. "Recipient agrees to indemnify and hold harmless the United States Government from any claims, costs, damages or losses that may arise from or through recipient's use of materials or commercial products."

THE COURT: That still doesn't mean that the folks at NIH have to go over to a two-week trial as defendants.

MR. LUBITZ: Well, I think that the fact is that

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Acambis would -- if there were a two-week trial and there were a verdict and if NIH -- that Acambis might well be liable.

THE COURT: That may be if NIH is liable. But at the end of the day NIH is still looking at headlines. Their professor does something wrong and the U.S. Government looks bad, even though Acambis may be footing the bill at the end of the day.

MR. LUBITZ: Well, again, Your Honor, I think it goes back to the point made by you and by the <u>Vioxx</u> court, that truth is not a bad thing, especially in light of the fact that there is no legal liability here on the part of NIH.

The last point that I just want to make is if the government truly was concerned here about its ability to participate in discovery, it could look at Federal Rule 24 and look at the question of intervention.

THE COURT: I somehow thought you would save that last little bit there. Okay. Yes. They do have intervention powers possibly. Okay.

Well, you all have been very helpful in educating me and, hopefully, moving along my analysis of this case. I am going to review some of my notes on this and try to give you some kind of rambling analysis of where I think this matter comes out.

It is not my intention to issue a detailed written memoranda on this point. So, this record is basically what the parties will be referred to, to the extent that you have a need to come back to it. Of course, it will be on file with the Clerk's Office, and you are free to order transcripts or whatever you needs may be to be addressed.

There is no dispute that Bavarian Nordic provided technology to NIH, and this is all about an effort to develop some better smallpox vaccine in compliance with some federal programs. And we have got RSPs out there and the Defendant, Acambis, and the Plaintiff, Bavarian Nordic, were awarded contracts, and I assume that one was still pending at the time of the filing of Plaintiff's motion.

But the Plaintiff contends that it gave this technology to NIH under two non-disclosure agreements on December of 2000 and February of 2001. Parenthetically. I don't recall seeing such agreements and certainly the existence of these agreements is in dispute, but my eyeballing those agreements is not really controlling here.

Bavarian Nordic contends that Professor Mayer provided technology to Dr. Bernard Moss, supposedly for research purposes only. NIH strongly disputes that characterization of it being for research purposes only. Bavarian contends that its competitor, Acambis, thereafter improperly obtained the technology from NIH by the hand of

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Dr. Moss.

There are documents that have been provided that suggest that this was done under a material transfer agreement dated 11/27/02, which includes Defendant's agreement, that is, Acambis' agreement, to indemnify the United States for any claim arising from its receipt of this technology.

The agreement also contains Acambis' agreement not to bring the United States into any lawsuit involving these technology materials, and Bavarian Nordic has reason to believe that Dr. Moss has a longstanding consulting relationship with Acambis and has previously engaged in providing Acambis with Plaintiff's confidential information.

Bavarian Nordic contends that Acambis has used
Bavarian's technology for a commercial advantage, and this is
all the essence of a lawsuit in the District of, I believe,
Delaware. But by way of deposition and production of
documents, Bavarian Nordic is seeking discovery on these
circumstances which led to Dr. Moss' receipt of the
technology and how it was provided to Acambis.

We certainly have a letter of August the 1st, 2006 where Dr. Kington, of NIH, advised Bavarian Nordic that it had failed to comply with 45 CFR Part 2 in the issuance of the subpoena. In that letter Dr. Kington noted that NIH did not improperly provide the technology, that the subpoena was

overly broad and sought privileged information without further specificity and stated that the documents had been previously provided in response to a FOIA request.

Dr. Moss also was prohibited from providing testimony on the technology and contracted issues when he was deposed in his individual capacity. That deposition occurred on August 28th. Also present at the deposition were counsel for the government, and Dr. Moss was prohibited from answering certain questions, leaving Bavarian Nordic's counsel with uncertainty as to what activities were conducted by Dr. Moss as part of his duties at NIH and which were done as part of any consulting activities on behalf of Acambis, if such existed.

Finally, on September 1 we have this letter that we have discussed at great length wherein Bavarian Nordic narrowed the discovery request and the scope of the hope of testimony from Dr. Moss. This was provided in an attempt to demonstrate the relevance of the sought after information, why it was not otherwise available and why disclosure was in the best interest of NIH. And as of the time of the filing, there was no indication that the government had provided any response thereto, and I think we have heard a little bit about that today.

I agree with the parties that this case is governed by Comsat Corporation vs. NSF, a 4th Circuit 199 decision,

and I believe that <u>Comsat</u> makes clear that in the Fourth Circuit we are to follow the Administrative Procedures Act.

That Act also includes -- rather, the <u>Comsat</u> case also includes the reference to a differential standard of review to agency action, and we are looking at 5 USC 706's standard of arbitrary and capricious conduct.

Let me put my hand on the section again where it says it in 706. "That to the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions and determine the meaning or applicability or the terms of an agency action. The reviewing court shall, 1) Compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; and 2) Hold unlawful and set aside agency action findings and conclusions found to be arbitrary, capricious and abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with the law."

The parties have not made reference to the other subparts, being b, c, d, e and f, and I don't take any issue with their non-relevance.

But 45 CFR 2.3 empowers the NIH director to permit testimony of employees or the disclosure of documents "based on a determination that compliance would promote the objectives of the department."

So, I take the time to look at the various factors,

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as did the <u>Comsat</u> Court, as did the <u>Vioxx</u> Court, in terms of whether or not the decisions here are arbitrary and capricious.

NIH says it produced documents under the FOIA Act in response to a subpoena in a proceeding before the International Trade Commission. Plaintiff contends that NIH only produced documents reflecting communications between Plaintiff and NIH, correspondence between Dr. Moss and Professor Mayor and lab notes regarding NIH's research on the technology.

The Plaintiff further states that nothing has been produced which relates to the circumstances of NIH's disclosure to Acambis and the requests have, thereafter, been narrowed. On this prong I find in favor of Bavarian Nordic.

The availability of documents from other sources.

The Plaintiff claims that it has narrowed the request to seek only internal NIH documents that are not available elsewhere.

NIH suggests that some of the documents are protected from disclosure by privilege. No log has been provided, as would be required under Rule 45, and I believe counsel have all agreed that Rule 45 as further modified by the arbitrary and capricious standard.

So, I won't touch so much upon the privilege question, but the availability of all of these documents from another source I don't think is true. I think there are

documents that are internal to NIH and not otherwise available from other places, which the Plaintiff has satisfied his burden on that point and should be entitled to those documents if all other points are in favor of Plaintiff or if, in fact, the Plaintiff carries the day on the balancing of factors here.

There is also a factor that I believe the <u>Comsat</u>

Court talked about; the indemnity relationship or whether or

not the Government has some exposure. And as a non-party,

NIH contends that it cannot defend its interests, and I think

through the course of discussion here that that interest

really is driven by its potential legal exposure. While not

in this case at present, it certainly may be down the road.

I have not heard any clear statement that the government is beyond the powers of any potential plaintiff to bring a lawsuit on these actions. Here there is the indemnification, there is a covenant not to sue or something to that effect by Acambis, but I do not find that the government's interests are completely covered.

Another factor is whether an injustice will occur if the government is not required to make a disclosure. I don't have enough information on that prong to say whether an injustice would occur. But the other balancing of interests involved is that Plaintiff suggests that NIH violates its own policy under 45 CFR 2.1(b) of maintaining strict

impartiality, as it believes that Dr. Moss has been aligned with Acambis and allegedly conveyed confidential information.

I don't know about the confidential information that may have preceded this particular involvement, and I don't know if the case has been proven, but it certainly is an interest that the Plaintiff is moving forward on. That is an important interest, the answer of which I have no way of knowing.

But I would agree with the Plaintiff that there would be no hardship for Dr. Moss to speak under oath again. He has done so once, and there is no reason to believe that such would impair or substantially impair the operations of NIH.

To the extent that there is a concern about the floodgates of litigation, I agree with the opinion writer in Vioxx, although I do believe that there is some Fourth circuit language to the contrary. The Plaintiff contends that the Project Bioshield Act promotes a partnership between the national defense and the private sector industry and the government in this area and that intellectual property protection is crucial to this effort.

That may be true. So that factor, if there is such, weighs in Plaintiff's favor. And Plaintiff's cover letter with the subpoena of July 24, 2006 noted that the litigation was, in part, concern with the "safeguards that

scientists rely on when they transfer innovative property to other researchers in the hope of creating opportunities for collaboration. These safeguards include assurances that the materials will be used only for research purposes."

That is an important interest. Whether or not it is subverted by the government's actions here is another question, and to the extent that there were any concerns about these requests being over broad, I believe that the Plaintiff has sufficiently narrowed the scope in the face of no further response from the NIH.

Assuming all of the representations of Bavarian

Nordic are true, and I do in large measure here, it is still

quite apparent to me that allowing Dr. Moss to testify would

more likely than not reveal evidence that is contrary to the

interests of NIH. There is the potential breach of

non-disclosure agreements. There is the potential complicity

with Acambis. There is potential tortous conduct, which is

not protected by sovereign immunity.

NIH's fears about facing a lawsuit for these very reasons has been articulated in its letter to Plaintiff of January 11th, 2006, when it was facing similar claims that were then lodged before the International Trade Commission. There is strong Fourth Circuit law in favor of the government. The most meaningful case for the Plaintiff, of course, is the Vioxx decision.

I am, however, drawn back to the Motor Vehicle decision. The Supreme Court made a ruling in Motor Vehicle Manufacturer's Association vs. State Farm in 1983 which said that the "scope of review under this arbitrary and capricious standard is narrow and the court is not to substitute its judgment. The agency must examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation, including a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made."

"Normally the agency rule is arbitrary and capricious if the agency relied on factors that Congress did not intend or failed to consider an important aspect of the problem or offered an explanation that runs counter to the evidence or is too implausible."

Further, in the <u>Maryland General Hospital</u> case, 4th Circuit of 2002, "The Court is to give substantial deference, though not blind obedience to the action of the agency."

I don't find anything "arbitrary or capricious" about the government's interest in protecting itself from allegation of misconduct. There are very limited exceptions to the Sovereign Immunity Doctrine, and the lawmakers have intended that the government can elect to protect or, should I say, prohibit disclosure under such circumstances.

Such an election has been made. Plaintiff's motion, accordingly, is denied, as well as the request for fees and expenses incurred.

My judgment, my view, my ideas about government transparency are completely irrelevant. Those who make the law determine what, if anything, the government's obligations are. And I think in this instance, while it may not be as one would expect in the typical civil scenario where we are expecting full disclosure on everything that is not privileged, there are other interests to be afforded here, and that is what the law attempts to get it.

Is it arbitrary? No. The government provides a reason. Is it capricious and mean spirited and filled with ill will? No. The government has articulated a reason.

Basically, self interest. Is it otherwise contrary to law?

Not at all. There is nothing in the actions of the government.

Even though there is the quotation about the strict impartiality and the reference to the Bioshield Act, I don't find that either of those fly contrary to the position taken by the government. So, as best as I can read it, I think that the government's action is protected here. Not only as to the testimony, but also as to the documents.

I suspect that this may not be the end of it, but hopefully, you all have sufficient information to work from and to take it to the next level. Any response further from the -- I guess Plaintiff gets to go first.

MR. LUBITZ: Well, I would like a clarification,

Your Honor. Are you denying the motion to compel both to the documents and to the testimony?

THE COURT: Yes. Because both are governed by the arbitrary and capricious question. If I analyze that question appropriately, whether the government is not providing these documents because it is not in their best interests, or if they are not allowing the testimony to go forward for the same reason, I think our discussion earlier came back to even under Rule 45 that would be modified by whether or not the government is acting in an arbitrary and capricious way.

And since that is the standard that governs both, I believe that their response, even though procedurally may be faulty, it comes back to that analysis at the end of the day.

MR. LUBITZ: Okay. Well, I just reserve objection on the record, because I think that there is a different standard for documents and testimony. But we can take that up. Thank you.

THE COURT: That is fair enough. Anything further from the NIH?

MR. HOSKIN: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. And, Mr. Dunn, I thank you again for your measured silence.

MR. DUNN: All I can say, Your Honor, is that while we would have enjoyed having the testimony and filed our own

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Tuhey request, we looked at the response and came to the same conclusion that Your Honor did, that it was reasonable.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, I thank you all again for your patience, and I wish you a good holiday season. Have a good day.

(Whereupon, the telephone conference was concluded.)

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I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from the electronic sound recording of the proceedings in the above-entitled matter.

- psuna Epa-Fabiana E. Barham

Transcriber

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